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1. Antecedents of the study, goal setting 
 
Working first as a lawyer, then later as a bank employee specializing in claims 
management, I experienced that during the insolvency induced forced proceedings 
(liquidation execution), the creditors had to endure financial losses substantially greater 
than what would be deemed reasonable and acceptable. This practical experience spurred 
me to investigate certain economical aspects of forced liquidations. 
 
In my paper, I wanted to examine first of all the proportion of the estimated market value 
of the properties realized during liquidation proceedings that goes toward actually 
satisfying the claims registered in the forced proceedings. Approaching the topic from a 
different angle, what percentage of the covering property is lost to the creditor, if said 
property is realized through liquidation proceedings. Based on my practical experience, I 
postulated that only a very small percentage of the estimated market value of assets 
realized during forced proceedings goes toward the actual satisfaction of the claim 
registered in the forced proceeding. 
 
Based on the above I first tried to set up an empirical index number that demonstrates the 
proportion of the return on the originally expected purchase price of the debtor’s property 
sold during forced liquidation, that is, what percentage of the estimated market price went 
toward actually satisfying the insured claim („value return rate”). After defining the 
empirical index number, I tried to list the factors detrimental to the value return rate. I 
hypothesized that the value return rate relative to the estimated market price is deteriorated 
by the cost-distorting effects of the forced liquidation market, the characteristics inherent 
in forced liquidations, the incredibly high cost of forced liquidations, and the effect of 
autonomous interest structures of the parties involved in forced liquidations on the 
proceedings themselves. 
I presented these factors in the paper, then investigated the possibility of measuring the 
degree of loss caused by the distorting effects. Finally I summarized my most important 
conclusions, and tried to formulate a few suggestions on improving the return rate relative 
to the estimated market price. 
.  
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In the Hungarian literature – as far as I know – no such comprehensive study has been 
carried out so far. This of course, does not mean that the market parties would not be 
dealing with these questions. The financial institutes in the course of their crediting activity 
use assessment and reduction of risks, establishment of security policies, assessment of 
coverage and determining the liquidation value as tools in trying predict the return rate of 
forced liquidations. The Hungarian National Bank as part of its supervising regulative 
function also deals with the question of validating coverages. However, it could be said 
that the topic is not intensely researched in Hungary, despite the importance of the question 
from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. 
 
Adequate legal background is one of the important pillars of economy’s healthy operation. 
The system of institutions on offer for the economy must not only create the possibility of 
continuing an enterprise, but must also provide effective mechanisms of rights 
enforcement. The realization of business security, the satisfaction of the demand for 
capital, the granting of credit for enterprises are all difficult to imagine in a legal 
environment where for example, the enforceability of a contract’s terms or the assertability 
of claims are not ensured. 
 
It is probably needless to emphasize that the above described can be acutely true for a 
country like Hungary, where foreign investments are especially important for the economy, 
where the local entrepreneurial sector is traditionally lacking in capital, where a significant 
part of the population wishes to create homes from long term loans.  
 
One of the important pillars of economy’s healthy operation is the acceptable assertion of 
claims. The low degree of forced liquidations’ efficiency is accompanied by several 
undesirable rippling consequences: 
- generates chain debts, that stop active enterprises 
- causes termination of jobs 
- results in tax proceeds shortage 
- holds in and raises the price of crediting, which, in a country short on capital 
creates a decline of entrepreneurial activity 
- the profits go to those involved in speculative deals, instead of those involved in the 
real economy. 
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Some of the above connections have been recognized centuries ago. The ministerial 
reasoning behind the 1881. LX article about the act of distress for example, indicated that 
the validation of claims „constitutes a well-known lever of trade credit stabilization, upon 
which great stress must be placed in a country especially deficient in funds”. At the same 
time, the indicators used to measure the economic competitiveness of countries takes 
substantially into account the working of the legal system, and especially the effectiveness 
of the law of bankruptcy. Thus, the effectiveness of the law of bankruptcy is a component 
of both the Business Competitiveness Index and the Global Competitiveness Index. 
 
It is apparent then that the topic of the paper, the efficiency of forced liquidations has 
increased importance both from a micro economic and a macro economic standpoint. 
 
Consequently, the goal of my research is to comprehensively present the efficacy of forced 
liquidations, and using it as a basis, to create an indicator that discerns the relationship of 
the estimated market price of movable and immovable properties sold through forced 
liquidations and the amount of the resulting proceeds that actually go toward satisfying the 
claim. Another aspect was to list and analyze the factors detrimental to the „value return 
rate” in comparison to the estimated market price. I aimed to present and dissect the 
indicated topic in such a way that the resulting paper presents practically useful 
conclusions, while also maintaining the harmony between the theoretical and the practical 
approaches. 
 
The exact practical end of the research was to evaluate the efficacy of forced liquidations 
and by so doing, provide a sort of basis for enterprises and other legal entities when 
making market decisions during the validation of claims. In this regard, the paper 
endeavors to suggest alternative business practices that can be used in place of forced 
proceedings. 
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2. Material and method 
 
The starting point for most studies is a review of the literature. Well, relatively few exact 
briefings can be gained from the economics monographs and articles in relation to the 
chosen topic, so during the preparation of the dissertation, I had to lean on practical 
experiences and my own empirical researches to a higher degree. 
 
In my research I used a relatively large sample, I investigated and analyzed all together 720 
successful sales of properties realized through liquidation proceedings during 2008 and 
2013. 
 
What interested me most during my research was the degree of the final sale price realized 
during the examined proceedings compared to the sold property’s estimated market price, 
and how much of the resulting amount went toward actually satisfying the creditor’s claim. 
This examination was facilitated by the fact that the law requires organizations of forced 
liquidations to assess individually, with professional tools the „market price” and use that 
as the first official guiding price.  In the XLIX act of 1991 about bankruptcy proceedings 
and liquidation proceedings (hereinafter Cstv.), the 49. § (1) paragraph makes it the 
liquidator’s duty to sell the debtor’s properties publicly and „at the highest current market 
price”. To do this the liquidator company (which by the way compulsorily employs an 
economist and an accountant) – based on the 225/2000 (XII.19.) government decree’s 5. § 
(3). paragraph’s a) section, and taking into account the opening balance established based 
on the C. law of 2000 about accounting – establishes with professional tools the individual 
market value/price of the properties to be sold. This will be announced as the first guiding 
price. During my investigation, I used this „estimated market price” as the starting point, 
and as the basis of comparison for the actually achieved sale price („the realized sale 
price”), and the amount that was truly spent on fulfilling the debtor’s claim („amount spent 
on satisfying the claim”). 
 
Within the data that I collected, I first divided the achieved sale price of the property sold 
through forced liquidation with the estimated market price. Thus I obtained the „realized 
value rate” that shows, what percentage of the estimated market price is achieved by the 
realized sale price. 
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Following this, I carried out additional calculations, where I decreased the realized sale 
price with the cost of forced liquidations, and adjusted the estimated market price of the 
properties to the amount that went toward actually satisfying the creditor’s claim, thus 
obtaining the „value return rate”. 
 
During the investigation of the price-distorting factors of forced liquidation markets, I 
carried out a relatively simple, questionnaire-based survey. I modelled a market situation 
that carries the characteristics of forced liquidation markets, and asked 470 potential 
customers about their behavior in the given circumstances. The questionnaire examined 
how much the price of a used item was affected by the number of those interested in said 
item and the desired goal of the potential customers during competition-type or auction-
type sales. 
 
The factors detrimental to the value return rate compared to the estimated market value – 
beyond the above – were examined in relation to exact case studies. 
 
During the presentation of forming processes and the gathered data, besides a descriptive 
exposition, I tried to formulate critical observations. 
 
3. Results 
 
In order to offer an overview on the efficiency of the conducted asset sales in the 
liquidation proceeding an empiric survey has been carried out: altogether 720 successful 
asset sales were examined and analysed in the period between 1
st
 January 2008 and 1
st
 June 
2013. In the sample different types of assets from various parts of the country were 
included. Here sales take place mainly through public tenders, and in exceptional cases 
through other advertisements. In every case the original guiding price of the asset intended 
for sale was sought based on court case number and the following facts were assigned to 
this: how much time and how many sales processes it took to perform the sale of chattel or 
realty, and for what amount these assets were sold eventually. 
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a) First, using the aggregated data from the examined liquidation proceedings, the total 
value of the estimated market price and the realised sale price, I conducted a regression 
analysis separated based on movable and immovable properties. 
 
 
 
The regression calculation conducted with immovables resulted in a positive outcome, 
because the variables are suitable for the establishment of a regressive model, since the F-
test is significant, the R and R
2
 values are both high. Likewise, it can be qualified as 
suitable based on the K-S test values, which surpassed the 0,05 mark. Regarding the 
modell’s parameters, although the constant value is not significant, but the original guiding 
price’s significance level is below the 0,05 mark. 
 
Thus the regressive modell is the following: Expected sale prace = 0,368*Original guiding 
price-384.144. From the R2 value it can be percieved that out of 100 cases, approximately 
fit the line. 
 
This level of connection was not demonstrable with movable properties, since the 
connection is weak between the original guiding price and the realised sale price. 
 
b) Among the asset sales in liquidation proceedings I was primarily interested in how the 
realised sale price correlates with the estimated market value. Thus I set up a quotient 
where the realised sale price was divided by the estimated market value (guiding price) 
determined by the liquidator in unique and specific expert methods. This quotient can be 
called rate of realised amount in the sales process. In case of the estimated value, it was 
the guiding price during the first auction or public tender that was considered the base, 
regardless of a possible reduction in the price after a first unsuccessful sales attempt. 
 
R R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 214 656 589 054 007 000,00  1 214 656 589 054 007 000  884,840 ,000
b
Residual 41 483 515 292 624 000,00     171 242 593 656 682 012          
Total 256 140 104 346 631 000,00  172
Unstandardi
zed 
Coefficients
Standardize
d 
Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 384144,020 1267867,892 ,303 ,762
,368 ,012 ,915 29,746 ,000
K-S teszt 
szig=0,23
Model
1
Eredeti Irányár
,915
a ,838 ,837 15 575 418       
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The results received from the 720 examined asset sales are summarised in the following 
table and diagram.   
 Chattel Realty Total 
Number of 
elements 
552 168 720 
Minimum 0,051 0,033 0,005 
Maximum 1,832 1,407 1,832 
Lower quartile 0,333 0,253 0,315 
Median 0,515 0,417 0,500 
Upper quartile  0,641 0,535 0,618 
Average 0,511 0,424 0,491 
 
Table 1: Statistics of rate of realised amount achieved in the liquidation sales  
(based on the 720 asset sales conducted between 2008 and 2013) 
Source: my own research, 2015. 
 
 
Diagram 1: Statistics of rate of realised amount achieved in the liquidation sales  
(based on the 720 asset sales conducted between 2008 and 2013) 
Source: my own research, 2015. 
 
The data above shows that in addition to the relatively uniform distribution of the sample 
elements, the aggregate rate of value (rate of realised amount) is 0,491, the rate of realised 
amount of chattels is 0,511 and the rate of realised amount of realties is 0,424. This implies 
that the actual sale price achieved at the auctions in the examined period was 51,1% of the 
original estimated value in point of chattels and 42,4% in point of realties while concerning 
the aggregate data calculated on the basis of every asset sale this figure is 49,1%. The fact 
that the value of the median and the average is relatively close to one another shows that 
just about the same number of elements are located above and below the average.  
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0,00%
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40,00%
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60,00%
Chattel Realty Total
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c) The question may arise whether how the prolongation of forced sale affects the rate of 
the realised sale price and the estimated market value of the sold asset (rate of realised 
amount).  
 
The analysis revealed that the rates of values (rates of realised amounts) achieved during 
the sales significantly differ from each other depending on the elapsed time. The conducted 
analysis of variance (by means of post-hoc test implemented by Scheffé’s method) clearly 
proved that if the sales process takes more time, the rate of value achieved during the sales 
(rate of realised amount) deteriorates.  
 
The analysis of variance revealed that the rate of value achieved in the sale (rate of realised 
amount) shows a difference in the categories of different timespans in case of both chattels 
and realties as well as aggregate data. 
 
d) During liquidation proceedings the liquidator makes the economic decisions, thus he has 
the opportunity to offer the debtor’s assets for sale either individually or collectively as a 
„package”. The decision made in this phase may affect the group of bidders and – partly as 
a result of this – the achieved sale price. 
 
I separately observed the rate of realised amount in case of individually sold assets and 
collectively marketed items, in this latter group those cases are involved where several 
different assets were offered for sale in a „package” and making an offer on them was only 
possible in combination. The reason to separately examine individual or collective sales of 
the assets is that during the two methods the liquidator’s decision, which is predominantly 
economic of nature, may significantly affect the marketability and the obtainable price of 
the asset. Thus the results gathered here will have a larger role in the chapter, where the 
effects of the profit oriented, from the creditor and debtor independent, primarily to the 
forced liquidation contributing third parties’ activities are investigated. 
 
The results deriving from the sales of the 720 examined assets are summarized by the 
following table and diagram divided into individual and collective sales. 
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 Individual 
chattel 
Collective 
chattel 
Individual 
realty 
Collective realty 
Number of 
elements 
384 168 106 62 
Minimum 0,024 0,005 0,033 0,033 
Maximum 1,500 1,832 1,407 1,317 
Lower quartile 0,379 0,241 0,274 0,196 
Median 0,539 0,470 0,415 0,432 
Upper quartile  0,650 0,593 0,537 0,542 
Average 0,538 0,449 0,430 0,415 
 
Table 2: Statistics of rate of realised amount achieved in liquidation proceedings broken 
down by individual and collective sales  
 (based on the 720 asset sales conducted between 2008 and 2013) 
Source: My own research, 2015. 
 
 
Diagram 2: Statistics of rate of realised amount achieved in liquidation proceedings 
broken down by individual and collective sales 
 (based on the 720 asset sales conducted between 2008 and 2013) 
Source: My own research, 2015. 
 
The figures above show that the rate of realised amount while selling either chattels or 
realties is less favourable in case of group sales. In the period under review the actual sale 
price achieved at auctions considering chattels is an average of 53,8% of the original 
estimated value when the asset was sold individually, while in case of collective sales this 
figure is 44,9% of the guiding price, i.e. almost 9% less. The same numbers respecting 
realties: 43% of the original estimated value in case of an individual sale, and 1,5% less, 
i.e. 41,5% when the real estate can only be purchased in a package. 
 
e) From 1
st
 January 2015 auctions and public tenders during liquidation proceedings are 
organized through electronic sales systems.  
53,80% 
44,90% 
43,00% 41,50% 
0,00%
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60,00%
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When comparing the rate of realised amount achieved in traditional and electronic 
procedures not only my research was at my service but also the survey conducted in 2015 
and published in Koroseczné Pavlin Rita’s doctoral thesis entitled A felszámolási eljárás 
alá került hazai kisvállalkozások helyzetének elemzése. In it the author analysed 331 
tender and auction sales performed by means of electronic sales system between 1
st
 
January 2015 and 31
st
 July 2015.
1
 Comparing the results of the two surveys were 
somewhat difficult due to the following facts: first of all in her research Koroseczné Pavlin 
Rita did not correlate the realised sale price with the original estimated value but with the 
last guiding price immediately preceding the successful sale, furthermore she analysed 
chattels by dividing them into two groups, highlighting vehicles. The results of the 
analysed 331 asset sales are summarized in the following table. 
 
 Vehicle Stockpile Realty 
Number of 
elements 
75 73 183 
Minimum 0,368 0,044 0,100 
Maximum 3,000 1,588 4,950 
Lower quartile 0,609 0,500 0,503 
Median 0,768 0,519 0,575 
Upper quartile  1,000 0,764 0,822 
Average 0,882 0,619 0,726 
 
Table 3: Statistics of rate of value correlated with the last guiding price achieved during 
liquidation proceedings  
(based on the 331 electronic asset sales conducted between 1
st
 January 2015 and 31
st
 July 
2015) 
Source: The research of Koroseczné Pavlin Rita (2015) 
 
In order to ensure the comparability of data, I carried out the following calculations. 
ea) From the figures of my own research, I made a series of data containing the rates of 
values correlated with the last guiding price (rate of realised amount)
 
which is summarized 
as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See: Koroseczné Pavlin, Rita – Kövér, György – Parádi-Dolgos, Anett: A vállalati vagyon értékének 
elemzése felszámolási eljárás során. In: Statisztikai szemle 2016/8-9., pages 918-924. 
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 Chattels Realties Total 
Number of 
elements 
553 171 724 
Minimum 0,010 0,030 0,010 
Maximum 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Lower quartile 0,500 0,500 0,500 
Median 0,549 0,531 0,539 
Upper quartile  0,667 0,660 0,667 
Average 0,583 0,600 0,587 
 
Table 4: Statistics of rate of value (rate of realised amount) correlated with the last 
guiding price achieved during liquidation proceedings 
(based on the 724 sales of assets completed between 2008 and 2013) 
Source: My own research, 2015. 
 
eb) From Koroseczné Pavlin Rita’s data I calculated the weighted average of the average 
rate of value of vehicles and stockpile, which became 0,752. The data received this way 
became comparable to the figures concerning chattels in my research. Then I calculated the 
weighted average of the average of all sales, the given number here is 0,738. 
 
The basic descriptive statistical data gained by comparing the two surveys revealed that by 
the introduction of the electronic sales system, the rate of value of the realised sale price 
and the estimated market value of the sold asset indeed improved. In case of chattels this 
improvement was + 0,169, i.e. a sale price higher by 16,9% of the guiding price was 
managed to be achieved, in case of realties this number was + 0,126, i.e. a sale price higher 
by 12,6% of the guiding price was managed to be achieved and in case of overall data the 
figure was + 0,139, i.e. a sale price higher by 13,9% of the guiding price was managed to 
be achieved. 
 
f) In order to reveal how much part, what proportion of the estimated market value of the 
sold asset may be appropriated for the satisfaction of the creditor’s claim, the realised sale 
price int he forced sale is needed to be reduced by the costs of the procedure.  
 
As already mentioned, the mutual relation between the estimated market value of movable 
and immovable assets subject to the forced sale and the amount achieved in the sale and 
appropriated for the actual recovery of the claim is attempted to be made palpable by 
introducing a specific index number. This is the rate of recovered amount correlated with 
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the estimated market value of the asset which can be calculated by means of the following 
simple equation.   
 
a = the sale price established based on the price of the last winning offer during the forced 
sale  
b = the market value determined prior to the forced sale by estimation 
c = the total cost incurred and deducted during the forced sale  
 
𝑋 =
𝑎
𝑏
× (
𝑎 − 𝑐
𝑎
) 
 
𝑋 =
𝑎 × (𝑎 − 𝑐)
𝑎 × 𝑏
 
 
𝑋 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
𝑏
 
 
However, determining the total cost incurred and deducted during the forced sale – 
indicated by (c) in the equation - is not easy, since there is no itemised data on it in the 
proceedings. 
 
As a consequence the total costs to be deducted (c) were calculated as a percentage of the 
achieved sale price by taking legal regulations and empirical evidence into consideration. 
On the one hand this was justified by the fact that the fee of the liquidator is also charged 
this way, on the other hand based on the obtained lists of costs, this solution gave realistic 
opportunity to estimate the extent of costs. 
 
The sum of the liquidator’s fee is usually 5% of the amount of income after the forced sale 
of the asset. In addition, numerous other costs and expenses emerge in the proceeding and 
legislative regulations enable to charge them. Such expenditures are, e.g., costs related to 
the safeguarding of assets, the sale of assets (appraisal, notary fee) and the fuel costs of 
using motor vehicles. 
 
The sample I examined during my research revealed that 56,2% of the realised sale price 
was settled as disbursement. 
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By summarizing the costs projected onto the realised sale price: the expenses of the 
bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding during the liquidation proceeding consumed 61,2% 
of the returns. 
 
When projecting the resulting values onto the applied equation the refund correlated with 
the estimated market value of the asset (the rate of recovered amount) in the liquidation 
proceedings may be calculated.  
   
𝑋 =
𝑎
𝑏
× (
𝑎 − 𝑐
𝑎
) 
 
(a) = the sale price established as winning offer during the forced sale 
(b) = estimated market value 
(c) = costs of the forced sale 
 
This formula may be applied in every unique proceeding by projecting the specific figures 
on it, however, here we aim to determine the overall data on all 720 asset sales in the entire 
timespan under review, therefore the values calculated above are used during the 
calculations as follows: 
 
the quotient of (a) and (b) has already been calculated in 3.2.1 (see Table 1), its value is: 
0,491. 
the value of (c) derived on the basis of cost calculations in this 3.3 section fo the study  is 
0,612(a) 
(a) – (c) = (a) – 0,612(a) = 0,388(a)   
the quotient of 0,388(a) and (a) = 0,388 
According to the above:  
X = 0,491*0,388 = 0,191 
Based on the calculations above we can conclude that in the period under investigation 
(from 1
st
 June 2008 to 1
st
 June 2013) with respect to the examined sample (720 successful 
auction realised in the liquidation proceeding) the rate of recovered amount was 0,191 
during the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. This means that only an average of 19,1% 
of the sold assets' estimated market value is applied to satisfy the creditors' claims. In the 
creditor's point of view, the rest is vanished: the low sale price (being in contrast with the 
estimated value) and the costs of liquidation consumed it.   
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g) I created a relatively simple poll to prove that the peculiarities of forced sale markets 
really affect the obtainable sale price in a negative way. I modelled a market situation 
having the special characteristics of the particularities of forced sale markets, thereafter 
altogether 470 potential buyers were asked how they would behave under given 
circumstances.  The created questionnaire examined to what extent the number of potential 
buyers interested in a used product and their intentions with the deal influence the price of 
the given product in case of auction or tender sales – assuming it is clear for all players that 
the seller must sell the offered product within a relatively short period of time.  
 
In the poll I took the sale of an ordinary used asset, namely a car of 2 000 000 HUF value 
as a sample. 
 
First I wanted to know how the subjects participating in the poll would behave if they 
would not need a car but had 2 000 000 HUF liquid capital with the intention of gaining 
profit by the investment and they would be aware that the seller needs to sell the vehicle by 
all means in a short time limit. Here I raised the question to the subject participating in the 
survey that as a potential buyer what amount he would offer for the car knowing that 
a) he is the only person bidding 
b) 3 other people are bidding 
c) a total of 100 other people are bidding. 
 
After that I raised the question: How would the amount of the bid develop if the subjects 
would do the purchase under the same conditions except that they would buy the vehicle 
for their own use and they would possess the liquid capital correspondent to the market 
price as well. I converted the responses received to the percentage of the estimated market 
value (2 000 000 HUF). The averages obtained are depicted in Diagram 3.    
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Diagram 3: Buyers’ behaviour on forced sale markets  
(based on a survey questioning 470 people ) 
Source: My own research, 2015. 
 
In case of a purchase with resale intention the potential buyers if they were the only 
bidders were willing to offer 49% of the market price for the product, while in case of 
having to more competitors this number was 62%, and along with 99 other bidders they 
would be inclined to pay 65% of the market price for the goods. In case of purchasing for 
own use, higher bids were offered. Here, being the only bidder, the potential buyers offered 
57% of the market price, on a market having three bidders this rate was 74% and in case of 
100 bidders they offered 84%.   
 
4. Conclusions  
 
As I mentioned above, an important pillar of the healthy operation of economy is the 
availability of efficient law enforcement mechanisms. In the lack of voluntary compliance 
the realisation of assets ultimately takes place within the framework of bankruptcy or 
insolvency proceedings. Such bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings are, for instance, 
enforcement proceedings and liquidation proceedings. Within the framework of such 
proceedings the funds necessary for satisfying the claim are partially attempted to be 
covered by marketing the debtor’s assets. 
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The efficiency of forced sales fundamentally affects the effectiveness of realising claims 
thus having a huge influence on the operation of economy. If players of the market access 
their legitimate demands with difficulty or the rate of return correlated with the validated 
claim is low, it can have serious economic consequences. 
 
Below I’ll attempt to list the paper’s – as I see it, most important - conclusions. Alas, 
proposals present here had to be sometimes inevitably lifted from their context from the 
previous pages, so I do encourage you, Dear Reader, to not be satisfied with the succinct 
conclusions in this chapter, but examine the complete study. 
 
a) In the post regime-change era of Hungary, it is almost of no consequence which time 
period we examine, or the manner of indicators we set up for measuring the efficacy of 
forced proceedings, the indicators will always show enormous financial loss on the 
creditor’s side. 
 
b) My research primarily examines the losses incurred during the forced liquidation of 
properties, by using an index number that discerns the relationship of the estimated market 
price of movable and immovable properties sold through forced liquidations and the 
amount of the resulting proceeds that actually go toward satisfying the claim. 
 
c) In the process of forced liquidation, the return in comparison to the estimated market 
price deteriorates in two steps. First, when the final sale price is lower than the estimated 
market price, and second, when the costs of the forced proceedings are deducted from the 
purchase price. 
 
d) Based on the conducted empirical research, the sale price of properties sold through 
forced liquidations compared to the estimated market price was 49, 1%. 
 
e) According to my research the cost of forced proceedings take up 61, 2% of the purchase 
price. 
 
f) Based on my empirical research, I was able to establish a value return rate, in correlation 
with the estimated market price, typical to liquidation. To determine this rate, the cost of 
the proceedings was deducted from the obtained sum (which I counted as the amount of 
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purchase price expressed in percentages) and the resulting total was then divided by the 
estimated market price.  
 
g) The realized purchase price was, on average, 49,1% of the estimated market price, this 
number was then lowered further by deducting the cost of proceedings, which amounted to 
61,2% of the purchase price. Thus 38, 8% of the 49, 1% of the estimated market price goes 
toward actually satisfying the claim. The resulting, value return rate in comparison to the 
estimated market price is 19, 1%. 
 
h) I listed the value return rate compared to the estimated market price, the deteriorating 
factors during forced liquidations, I identified  the following as such: the cost distorting 
effect of liquidation markets, the characteristics inherent to forced liquidations, the unreal 
costs of forced liquidations, and the effect of the autonomous interest structures of parties 
performing forced liquidations on the proceeds themselves. 
 
i) I examined the characteristics of the forced liquidation market and arrived at the 
conclusion that this market has characteristics both on the supply and demand side, that 
affect negatively the final purchase price of the properties on offer. Such characteristics, on 
the supply side, are the incidental and hectic nature of the stock, the presence of less 
marketable wares, the heterogeneous supply, its composition is mixed in terms of both type 
and quality, the particular relationship between the seller and the buyer, resulting in the 
necessity of the sale and the condition that the information about the supply reaches the 
potential buyers through narrow, specific channels. The characteristics on the demand side 
are the lack of transparency, the negative attitude towards participating in forced 
liquidations, the relatively low number of participants, the resulting, special market 
structure that shows kinship with a demand oligopoly, the emergency situation of the seller 
causing an advantageous bargain position for the buyer, the special intentions of the 
potential buyers, who often place bids in order to acquire the margin between the 
property’s purchase price and it’s resale price. 
 
j) My questionnaire, which modelled the market of forced liquidations, clearly proved my 
hypothesis that the above described characteristics of the forced liquidation market affect 
negatively the purchase price obtainable through forced liquidation. 
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k) I attempted to estimate the price distorting effects of the forced liquidation market, using 
the results of the questionnaire conducted with potential buyers. I set up three categories 
for certain factors of specific markets in terms of estimating the price distorting effects, 
and gave them index numbers. Based on my research, the fact of forced liquidation 
decreases the obtainable purchase price by 16%, the demand oligopoly’s (oligopsony) 
characteristics by 6, 5% and the resale intent by 9%. Consequently, taking into account 
only the price distortion of market characteristics, the average purchase price would be 68, 
5% of the market price. At the same time, it is remarkable, that if we look at the results of 
the earlier presented empirical research, which showed the realized purchase price as 49, 
1% of the estimated market price, then we can assume that other, separate factors 
deteriorate the purchase price with an additional 20% of the estimated market price. 
 
l) I gave a detailed presentation of the forced liquidation methods, types of auctions. I 
pointed out that the auctions used in Hungarian forced liquidations are public auctions. In 
the course of a forced liquidation the liquidator has two choices when it comes to auction 
subtypes: the liquidator can organize an auction in the manner of English auction, or 
organize a public competition, a first price sealed bid auction. In order to reach the higher 
purchase price I suggested rethinking the sale methods used in forced liquidations. It is 
worth considering that in forced liquidations, along or instead of first price auctions, sealed 
second-price auctions could be made available. The need for change also arises in regard to 
the asking price and the minimal price. It should be considered on one hand that – if the 
option to bid below the asking price remains – the asking price should be defined above the 
estimated price. On the other, determining the minimal price individually, before every 
auction, without making it known to the potential bidders beforehand, and only disclosing 
it after the bidding phase has ended, may result in an increase of earnings. With the above 
measures, we could avoid offering the auction’s subject to potential buyers, at a 
determined percent of the estimated market price from the outset. 
 
m) I presented a few typical shapes that the unreal (excessive, without legal base) costs of 
forced liquidations can take and suggested their rationalization and the provision of a wider 
judicial or creditorial supervision when inspecting these costs.  
 
n) I pointed out that the value return rate compared to the estimated market price may be 
damaged by the activity of a profit oriented, from the debtor and creditor independent,  
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third party (i.e.: liquidator) involved in the forced liquidation: on the one hand with their 
economic decisions, on the other with the corruption arising in their activity. As a solution, 
I suggested here too the widening of creditorial and judicial control, as well as the 
inclusion of the creditor in economic decisions.  
 
5. New research results 
 
During the writing of this dissertation some of my original hypotheses were modified, the 
results spurred me to rethink a few of the questions and to formulate a few new ones. 
Based on these, taking my research as the basis, we can draw up the following hypotheses 
and in connection with them, new and novel scientific results  
 
Goal: The fundamental goal of the paper was to find out what percentage of the estimated 
market price of movable and immovable properties sold through forced liquidations as is 
spent on actually fulfilling the claim. 
 
Hypothesis1: The realized purchase price obtained from selling assets in the course of 
liquidation proceedings substantially lags behind the estimated market price in the case of 
both movable and immovable properties. 
 
Result1: The actual purchase price obtained from liquidation proceedings between 2008. 
June 1. and 2013. June 1. based on the examined sample is with movables on average 51, 
1% of the estimated market price, with immovables 42, 4%, while with all assets combined 
the total percentage is 49, 1%. (realized value rate expressed in percentages.) 
 
Hypothesis2: During the course of the forced liquidations realized as liquidation 
proceedings, the realized value rate (the quotient of the realized purchase price and the 
estimated market price) decreased with the temporal protraction of the proceedings. 
 
Result2: The analysis of variance showed in all cases of movables and immovables and 
the combined data that the realized value rate obtained through sale presented deviation in 
the different time categories, its value decreased as the duration of the proceedings 
increased. 
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Hypothesis3: The realized value rate presents better results if the assets are sold separately 
and worse results if they are sold as a group. 
 
Result3: The realized value rate is worse both in the case of movables and immovables if 
they are sold as a group. The final purchase prices obtained during auctions in the 
examined time period is in the case of movables, on average 53,8% of the estimated 
market price, if sold individually, but if sold as a group, the percentage is 44,9%, almost 
9% less, than the guiding price. In the case of immovables, the numbers are: 43% of the 
estimated market price, if sold individually and 41, 5%, that is, 1, 5% lower if sold as a 
group. 
 
Hypothesis4: The introduction of an electronical marketplace causes an increase of the 
realized purchase price and the rate of the estimated market price, the realized value rate. 
 
Result4: The introduction of an electronical marketplace caused an increase of the realized 
purchase price and the rate of the estimated market price. In the case of movables the 
improvement is + 0,169, that is the final price was better by 16, 9% than the guiding price, 
in the case of immovables, the improvement is + 0,126, that is the purchase price was 
better than the guiding price by 12, 6%, in the case of combined data, the improvement 
was + 0,139, that is the purchase price was better by 13, 9% than the guiding price. 
 
Hypothesis5: The purchase price obtainable through auctions in the course of forced 
liquidations is distorted negatively by the characteristics of forced liquidation markets. 
 
Result5: I was able to identify and verify several characteristics of the forced liquidation 
markets that negatively distort the purchase price obtainable at the auctions of liquidation 
proceedings. These are 
a) Price distorting effects related to the fact of forced liquidations (on the supply side: the 
incidental and hectic nature of the stock, the presence of less marketable wares, the 
heterogeneous supply, its composition is mixed in terms of both type and quality, the 
particular relationship between the seller and the buyer, resulting in the necessity of the 
sale and the method of forced liquidations; on the demand side: lack of transparency and 
the negative attitude toward participation in forced liquidations) 
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b) Price distorting effects related to the oligopsonic market structure ( on the supply side: 
the presence of a large number of insolvent legal entities, the condition that the information 
about the supply reaches the potential buyers through narrow, specific channels; on the 
demand side: the relatively low number of participants, who are aware that the sale is 
compulsory on the seller’s side) 
c) Price distorting effects related to resale-motivated purchases (on the supply side: the 
incidental and hectic nature of the stock, the presence of less marketable wares; on the 
demand side: the special intentions of potential buyers, who often place bids in order to 
acquire the margin between the property’s purchase price and it’s resale price. 
 
Hypothesis6: The costs of liquidation proceedings often decrease by an unwarranted 
amount the sum acquired through forced liquidations, that could actually go towards 
satisfying the claim, and thus substantially degrade the rate of the estimated market prices 
of the subjects of forced liquidation, the movable and immovable properties and the sum 
that is used to actually satisfy the claim (value return rate). 
 
Result6: On the examined sample the value return rate of sales during forced liquidations 
is: 0,191. On average, 19, 1% of the property’s estimated market price went toward 
fulfilling the creditor’s claim. The amount beyond this is lost from the creditor’s 
perspective: it was consumed by the costs of the liquidation and low purchase price relative 
to the estimated market price.  
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6. Suggestions 
 
The calculations conducted in this paper and the conclusions can serve as humble 
contributions to the theory when examining the price calculation of forced liquidations. 
The results of the dissertation can contribute to the practice, by helping creditors make 
economic decisions and by assisting – while also considering economic aspects - the 
further improvement of the legal regulation of forced liquidation. 
 
Trivial, but very important conclusion, that in the bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding the 
creditor shall count on a substantially smaller refund than the estimated market value of the 
underlying asset.  Bearing this in mind, in an economic point of view any other solution is 
better from the creditor’s side to realise the claim than stepping onto the road of 
bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding and putting the asset in question on the forced sale 
market.   Such solutions might be a debt settlement agreement (even by partially releasing 
the debt or by authorizing the debtor to sell the collateral asset on his own terms), the 
conversion of claims into asset the takeover of economic activity from the debtor or 
possibly creating a company for this purpose. Bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings and 
forced sales within them should be seen as ultima ratio. In this context forces sales have 
two roles. On one hand, the inevitability of legal consequence with serious disadvantage 
always influences the debtor’s willingness to perform in a good way and increases the 
probability of voluntary compliance. On the other hand, the quantified value of obtainable 
return in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding is a starting point for decisions on 
alternative strategies for case management.  
 
In order to avoid the appearance of collateral assets on forced sale market and to be able to 
develop an appropriate case management strategy against an insolvent legal entity at an 
early stage, a special emphasis is need to be put on bankruptcy predictions. Early warnings 
about the potential risk of bankruptcy create the potential to make decisions minimising 
losses. Provided that the debtor is an economic organisation, numerous methods are at 
hand for this. In this phase mainly the analysis of data of annual financial statements and 
the evaluation of various index numbers provide opportunities. Here we should pay close 
attention to the fact that corporate management is a process and accordingly insolvency is 
the final outcome of a longer or shorter period characterised by financial problems. In 
reality efficient case management can only be ensured if the contract of the parties had 
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previously set specific options in case of the occurrence of insolvency emergency revealed 
by bankruptcy prediction. Thus it becomes clear that the completion of a transaction 
satisfying business needs requires complex and simultaneous economic and legal 
approach.  
 
However, it can be a de lege ferenda suggestion for the legislation to rethink the sale 
methods used in forced proceedings, for example enabling sealed second-price auctions 
along or instead of first-price auctions; prescribing that the auctioneers, contestants must 
place their bids without knowledge of the defined minimal price. It may be necessary to 
rationalise the costs of forced liquidations, and to develop a wider judicial or creditorial 
control in order to supervise the economical decisions of liquidators.  
 
  
25 
 
7. Scientific publications written in the dissertation’s topic; educational publications; 
lectures (conferences, symposiums, debates, sessions) 
 
 
1. Kapa M: Ha az adós nem fizet.. (második, átdolgozott kiadás) HVG-Orac, Budapest, 
2012. [263 p.] ISBN 978 963 258 154 5 
2. Kapa M: Felelősség a közvagyonnal való gazdálkodásért – avagy jogágak véletlen 
találkozása a boncasztalon. In: Pénzügyi Szemle 2011/4., 471-480. old. 
3. Kapa M: A kényszereljárások eredménytelensége – okok és következmények. In: 
Gazdasági Élet és Társadalom. 2012/1-2., 98-107. old. 
4. Kapa M: Dreptul insolvenţei şi instabilitatea economică în Ungaria. In: Radu Bufan – 
Lucian Bercea (coordinatori): Dreptul insolvenţei şi instabilitatea economică. 
Bucureşti, 2013., 74-81. old.  
5. Kapa M: Dilemmas regarding the Regulations on cross-border enforcement. In: 
Gazdasági Élet és Társadalom. 2013/1-2., 172-181. old. 
6. Kapa M: A kényszerértékesítések jellemző sajátosságai. In: Polgári Szemle 2015/1-3. 
szám.  
7. Kapa M.: Aukciók a magyarországi felszámolási eljárásokban. In: Polgári Szemle 
2016/4-6. szám., 98-110. old. 
8. Kapa M: Certain economic aspects of forced sales in Hungary. In: Moderni Veda 
(Modern Science) 2017/1., Prague (in press) 
 
 
